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SCHREMS’S SLIPPERY SLOPE:
STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
TO REHABILITATE EU-U.S. CROSS-BORDER
DATA TRANSFERS AFTER SCHREMS II
Edward W. McLaughlin*
In July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
invalidated the Privacy Shield Framework, the central data governance
mechanism that once governed cross-border data transfers from the
European Union (EU) to the United States. For the second time in five years,
Europe’s top court invalidated the primary method of cross-border data
transfers. Both times the CJEU found that the United States’s surveillance
laws were, and remain, overbroad and fail to provide EU citizens with
protections that are essentially equivalent to those guaranteed under the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in light of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
As a result, more than 5400 companies that utilized the Privacy Shield
Framework are now scrambling to implement new mechanisms to govern
their data transfers along with what they hope are effective supplementary
technical, operational, or contractual measures to achieve an essentially
equivalent level of protection for their cross-border data transfers from the
EU to the United States.
Currently, there exists minimal guidance about how companies may satisfy
the GDPR’s requirements. Even if the United States and the EU negotiate
and implement a “Privacy Shield 2.0” in the near future, a new framework
is unlikely to remedy some of the faults the CJEU has consistently identified
in U.S. surveillance law. This Note argues that a combination of private-law
enhancements, contractual and technical, along with minor modifications to
the administrative and judicial oversight of U.S. intelligence agencies, is
required to create a sound and stable framework that achieves the needs of
EU individuals’ privacy rights and still enables the United States to exercise
legitimate foreign surveillance in the interest of national security.
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; M.S., 2012, Syracuse University;
B.S., 2011, Syracuse University. I would like to thank Professor Olivier Sylvain for his
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INTRODUCTION
As part of the modern, digital, and international economy, companies of
all sizes transfer the personal information of their users or customers across
international borders as part of their normal business operations.1 Naturally,
such transfers are subject to the laws and regulations of the respective
jurisdictions in which the transfers transpire.
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) permits the transfer of
European Union (EU) subjects’ data from the EU to third-party (“non-EU”)
countries only if the transfers utilize certain approved transfer mechanisms.2
The mechanisms are acceptable under European law so long as the data
protections in those non-EU countries are “essentially equivalent” to those of
the EU.3
The EU and the U.S. Department of Commerce created the Privacy Shield
Framework (“Privacy Shield”) as an approved transfer mechanism to
facilitate efficient data transfers to the United States based on the GDPR’s
mandate.4 The Privacy Shield is a series of data privacy and security
principles that U.S. companies agree to abide by in processing or transferring
personal information between the EU and the United States.5 The EU
determined the Privacy Shield provided adequate safeguards and protection
for EU data subjects that was consistent with the requirements under
European law.6 Therefore, by self-certifying and remaining compliant with
the Privacy Shield, U.S. companies were able to execute their relevant
business in the EU.
Then, in July 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
the EU’s highest court, held that U.S. protections for individual data rights
under the Privacy Shield were inadequate,7 in part because of U.S.
authorities’ broad ability to access the data.8 As a result, EU and U.S.
1. Before the Privacy Shield was declared invalid in July 2020, more than 5400
companies, 70 percent of which were small- and medium-sized enterprises, used the Privacy
Shield for their EU-U.S. cross-border data transfers. The Invalidation of the EU-US Privacy
Shield and the Future of Transatlantic Data Flows: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com.,
Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. 5–6 (Dec. 9, 2020) (testimony of James M. Sullivan, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Services, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/8F72849E-3625-4687-B8F571AFF4640D1F [https://perma.cc/99VY-MY47].
2. See generally Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L
119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
3. Id. recital 104.
4. See id. recital 108.
5. See Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 Pursuant to
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the
Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 48 (EU) [hereinafter
Privacy Shield Decision].
6. See id.
7. See Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. & Maximillian Schrems
(Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 201 (July 16, 2020).
8. See id. ¶ 180 (holding that U.S. law supporting the Privacy Shield does not impose
limitations on the power of U.S. authorities to implement certain surveillance programs and,
therefore, cannot ensure a level of protection “essentially equivalent” to that in the EU under
the GDPR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights).
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companies can no longer rely on the Privacy Shield for their cross-border
transfer needs.9 The decision caused immediate problems for more than 5400
companies that relied on the Privacy Shield10 because it did not allow for any
grace period during which firms could continue to be protected by the
practice while a new solution was created.11
In Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland and Maximillian
Schrems12 (Schrems II), the CJEU rendered its decision in two parts. First,
it upheld the validity of standard contractual clauses (SCC), a type of
private-law solution, in principle.13 Second, however, the CJEU emphasized
that data controllers and processors (the contracting companies or entities)14
are still obligated to make sure adequate protections exist in the relevant
third-party countries.15 The CJEU’s invalidation of the Privacy Shield
applied specifically to the EU-U.S. framework.16 The SCC decision applies
generally to the standard clauses used between companies in any third-party
country and places the onus on the parties to determine the adequacy of
protection in their respective countries or territories.17 However, the court’s
assessment of U.S. law’s inadequate data protections—mainly that U.S.
authorities are too broadly authorized to access and analyze data and that EU
subjects lack adequate judicial redress against such abuse—means
cross-border transfers to the United States using SCCs suffer the same
inadequate protections in practice as those that relied on the now-defunct
Privacy Shield.18
The decision marks the second time in five years that the CJEU declared
the primary EU-U.S. cross-border data transfer mechanism invalid. The
CJEU reached the same conclusion previously in 2015 in Maximillian

9. See id. ¶ 201.
10. See Press Release, Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Com., U.S. Dep’t of Com., U.S. Secretary
of Commerce Wilbur Ross Statement on Schrems II Ruling and the Importance of EU-U.S.
Data Flows (July 16, 2020), https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/index.php/news/pressreleases/2020/07/us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-statement-schrems-ii-ruling-and.html
[https://perma.cc/MT3D-XJJE] [hereinafter Statement on Schrems II Ruling].
11. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE JUDGMENT
OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CASE C-311/18–DATA PROTECTION
COMMISSIONER V FACEBOOK IRELAND LTD AND MAXIMILLIAN SCHREMS 2 (2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/20200724_edpb_faqoncjeuc31118_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75TN-83M9].
12. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. & Maximillian Schrems
(Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020).
13. See id. ¶ 148.
14. For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to understand that controllers and
processors are the entities involved in the collection, storage, dissemination, or other
processing of personal data and transfer of that data to recipients. See GDPR, supra note 2,
art. 4(7)–(8). In this context, a controller will typically be the EU-based data exporter and the
processor will be the U.S.-based importer. See id. However, a more detailed explanation and
definition of the roles is in Article 4 of the GDPR. See id.
15. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 131.
16. See id. ¶ 199.
17. See id. ¶ 134.
18. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 11, at 2.
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Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner19 (Schrems I). Schrems I
invalidated the Safe Harbor Framework, which had been the cross-border
data transfer agreement in place between the United States and the EU since
2000.20
Both cases were the result of complaints initially brought by Austrian
privacy activist, Maximillian Schrems, in response to Edward Snowden’s
2013 public revelations about the scale and scope of some of the U.S.
intelligence authorities’ surveillance programs.21 Schrems’s suits asserted
that, based on those surveillance programs, the law and practice in the United
States did not ensure “adequate protection” of his personal data.22 In both
cases, the CJEU agreed and held that the United States does not ensure
adequate protection of EU data subjects’ information.23
This Note explores the implications of Schrems II, as well as the practical
difficulties thousands of companies across the United States and Europe now
face in the continuation of their business. It examines the most compelling
proposals to fix the immediate operational problem for companies engaged
in cross-border data transfers, while also examining the need and advocating
for practical adjustments to U.S. surveillance law that could provide much
needed stability. To adequately address the redress issues raised in Schrems
II, this Note proposes technical and operational recommendations, like
encryption and SCCs, as a partial solution, while advocating for more
substantive, yet pragmatic, legislative change in the United States.
Part I of this Note explores the landscape of governance mechanisms for
cross-border data transfer under the GDPR. In this context, it examines the
EU’s principles and requirements, the mechanisms U.S. firms used to
execute transfers in compliance, and the reasons the CJEU invalided the
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield in Schrems II. Part II examines the precarious
situation in which the decision leaves technology companies and presents
potential proposals for how the companies and the U.S. may adapt to the
decision. Part III advocates for pragmatic private-law solutions to enhance
protections for data subjects and proposes a relatively narrow adjustment to
the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to
allow for appropriate redress under certain circumstances. Such a solution is
most likely to adequately address the concerns articulated by the CJEU with
minimal disruption to U.S. interests in foreign surveillance.

19. Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r (Schrems I),
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015).
20. See Daniel Solove, Sunken Safe Harbor: 5 Implications of Schrems and US-EU Data
Transfer, TEACHPRIVACY (Oct. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/sunken-safe-harbor-5implications-of-schrems-and-us-eu-data-transfer/ [https://perma.cc/ABB3-RQRV].
21. See Press Release, Ct. of Just. of the European Union, The Court of Justice Declares
That the Commission’s U.S. Safe Harbour Decision Is Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015),
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KSA-X6AV]; see also Schrems II, C-311/18 ¶¶, 50–55.
22. See Press Release, supra note 21; see also Schrems II, C-311/18 ¶¶, 50–55.
23. See Press Release, supra note 21; see also Schrems II, C-311/18 ¶¶, 50–55.
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I. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION AND THE U.S.
SURVEILLANCE LANDSCAPE
To understand why the CJEU declared the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield to be
inadequate under the GDPR’s requirements, it is necessary to understand
what those requirements are and how they relate to some basic provisions of
the U.S. legal surveillance apparatus. This part will first describe the GDPR
provisions that are relevant to cross-border data transfers and then explain
why the CJEU determined U.S. laws do not meet the GDPR’s requirements
under EU law. Part I.A describes Europe’s relevant fundamental principles
and requirements for acceptable cross-border data transfer mechanisms under
the GDPR. Part I.B discusses the relevant U.S. surveillance laws. Part I.C
explains the Schrems II court’s reasoning that the Privacy Shield does not
satisfy the tension between U.S. surveillance laws and European data
subjects’ privacy rights and thus fails to meet the GDPR’s requirements.
A. GDPR Data Requirements
The European Parliament enacted the GDPR in 2016 to account for the
transformation of society and the economy through technological
development and globalization, while ensuring a high level of personal data
protection.24 The GDPR permits cross-border data transfers only when those
transfers are: (1) executed in accordance with an adequacy decision,25 (2)
implemented with other appropriate safeguards,26 or (3) deemed necessary
or as satisfying other circumstances to derogate from the approved
mechanisms.27
Part I.A.1 outlines the GDPR’s protections and the foundational European
data protection principles on which the GDPR operates. Part I.A.2 explains
the adequacy decision requirement and the European Commission’s
conclusion that the Privacy Shield met those requirements. Part I.A.3
examines acceptable mechanisms in the absence of an adequacy decision.
Part I.A.4 explores the parameters that allow cross-border transfers without
a prior European Commission decision.
1. An Overview of the GDPR and the EU’s Foundational Principles
The GDPR provides data protections for subjects in the EU and the
European Economic Area (EEA).28 These protections include prohibiting

24. See GDPR, supra note 2, recital 6.
25. See infra Part I.A.2.
26. See infra Part I.A.3.
27. See infra Part I.A.4.
28. The EEA refers to the EU member states, plus three additional European nations
(Norway, Lichtenstein, and Iceland) that are within the economic sphere. See Agreement
Between the European Union, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway on an EEA Financial
Mechanism 2014–2021, 2016 O.J. (L 141) 3. Under the EEA Agreement, EU legislation
relating to the movement of goods, services, persons, and capital are applicable to the EU
member states, as well as these three EEA nations. See id.
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the transfer of personal data outside of the EEA, unless certain conditions
providing appropriate protections are met.29
The protections are built on fundamental rights recognized by Europe in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”),30
which the Treaty of Lisbon31 made legally binding on the EU in 2009.32 The
Charter contains rights pertaining to: dignity,33 freedoms,34 equality,35
solidarity,36 citizens’ rights,37 and justice.38
Most relevant to this Note (and the CJEU’s Schrems II analysis) are the
privacy rights under Articles 7 and 8, as well as the right to effective judicial
redress in Article 47.39 Article 7 articulates a broad respect for private and
family life, stating “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her private
and family life, home and communications.”40 Article 8 protects privacy
with respect to one’s personal data, stating “[e]veryone has the right to the
protection of personal data concerning him or her” and that “[s]uch data must
be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of consent . . . or
some other legitimate basis.”41 Article 47 expressly provides for the right to
a “fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal” for anyone whose rights and freedoms are violated.42
In addition, Article 52 states that any legal limitations placed on the rights
and freedoms found in the Charter must, “[s]ubject to the principle of
proportionality, . . . be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet
objectives of general interest.”43 Taken together, the Charter enshrines EU
subjects’ substantive and procedural rights, which may be limited for
legitimate purposes, so long as those limitations “do not go beyond what is

29. See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 4450.
30. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391.
31. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
32. Why Do We Need the Charter?, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/aiddevelopment-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamentalrights/why-do-we-need-charter_en [https://perma.cc/R364-NQFL] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
33. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 396.
34. See id. at 397.
35. See id. at 399.
36. See id. at 401.
37. See id. at 403.
38. See id. at 405.
39. Id. art. 7, 8, 47.
40. Id. art. 7.
41. Id. art. 8.
42. Id. art. 47.
43. Id. art. 52(1).
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necessary and proportionate in a democratic society.”44 These principles are
part of the cultural and legal foundation on which the GDPR was built.45
The GDPR applies to any processing of EU subjects’ personal data even
if the controller or processor is located outside of the EU.46 Therefore
U.S.-based companies involved in the processing of EU subjects’ data are
governed by the GDPR’s regulation.47 This means U.S.-based companies
are also subject to very large penalties for violations arising from improper
cross-border data transfers. These penalties may amount to twenty million
euros or up to 4 percent of a company’s total worldwide revenue, whichever
is greater.48
Enforcement of the GDPR falls primarily on the independent supervisory
authorities, or Data Protection Authorities (DPA) of each of the member
states.49 However, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), consisting
of the heads of each of the DPAs, is the EU body in charge of enforcing the
GDPR.50 The EDPB issues enforcement guidelines, as well as binding rules,
that facilitate consistency across the EU.51
The GDPR encourages stable and predictable mechanisms for data
transfers like official adequacy decisions,52 while also accepting SCCs,
binding corporate rules, and other appropriate safeguards that may be
sufficient in the absence of an adequacy decision.53 The law also permits

44. EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., RECOMMENDATIONS 02/2020 ON THE EUROPEAN
ESSENTIAL GUARANTEES FOR SURVEILLANCE MEASURES 4 (2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/
edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_recommendations_202002_europeanessentialguaranteessurveillan
ce_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8SH-VR5M]. While the EU member states themselves
determine what is “necessary and proportionate” in the context of their own national security
concerns, the CJEU determines what that means in the foreign context—in this case, as it
applies to U.S. surveillance law. See Robert D. Williams, To Enhance Data Security, Federal
Privacy Legislation Is Just a Start, BROOKINGS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
techstream/to-enhance-data-security-federal-privacy-legislation-is-just-a-start/
[https://perma.cc/T53Y-QCTY]. Any discussion of hypocrisy or “dissonance between what
the EU is expecting of other governments and what it is able to ask of its member states” is
beyond the scope of this Note. Joshua P. Meltzer, The Court of Justice of the European Union
in Schrems II: The Impact of GDPR on Data Flows and National Security, BROOKINGS (Aug.
5, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-inschrems-ii-the-impact-of-gdpr-on-data-flows-and-national-security/ [https://perma.cc/S3GCX5BM]. Instead, this Note intends to identify a clear and effective path forward for EU-U.S.
cross-border data transfers based on the CJEU’s binding decision in Schrems II without
evaluating the validity of the decision.
45. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 395.
46. GDPR, supra note 2, art. 3.
47. See id.
48. See id. art. 83(5).
49. See generally id. ch. VI (outlining the independence, tasks, and powers of the
supervisory authorities to monitor and enforce the GDPR).
50. See id. art. 63–76.
51. See id.
52. See id. art. 45. For a discussion on adequacy decisions, see infra Part I.A.2.
53. See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 46.
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derogations in certain circumstances54 and allows for some transfers out of
necessity or with the data subjects’ explicit consent.55
2. The Process of and Requirement for Adequacy Decisions
Article 45 of the GDPR permits cross-border data transfers that are
executed pursuant to an “adequacy decision,”56 the mechanism by which the
Privacy Shield was approved.57 An adequacy decision is a determination by
the European Commission (“the Commission”), implemented by an act,58
that a specific non-EU country, or specified entities or sectors within that
country, provide adequate protection in accordance with the EU’s protection
principles.59 If cross-border transfers are executed within the parameters of
an adequacy decision, the transferring parties do not need to receive specific
case-by-case authorization of the transfers by the appropriate member state’s
DPA.60
The Commission considers a number of factors when it assesses the
adequacy of a third-party country’s protections.61 It considers “the rule of
law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation,
both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence,
national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to
personal data.”62 The Commission also contemplates the “existence and
effective functioning of one or more independent supervisory authorities in
the third country or to which an international organisation is subject”63 and
any commitments the third-party country or organization has entered into
“arising from legally binding conventions or instruments.”64
3. “Appropriate Safeguards” in the Absence of an Adequacy Decision
Although the Privacy Shield was a preferred and efficient mechanism
because of its official adequacy status, the GDPR also supports other
legitimate mechanisms that permit cross-border transfers even to third-party
countries or territories with inadequate protections not qualifying for an
adequacy decision. Article 46 of the GDPR outlines several private-law
safeguards or governance methods that could be used to authorize

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See infra Part I.A.4.
See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 49.
See id. art. 45.
See infra Part I.C.1.
See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 45(3).
See id. art. 45(1).
See id.
See id. art. 45(2).
Id. art. 45(2)(a).
Id. art. 45(2)(b).
Id. art. 45(2)(c).
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cross-border data transfers absent a Commission adequacy decision.65 These
include standard data protection clauses, which are also called SCCs.66
In 2010, the Commission approved twelve of these SCCs in its “SCC
Decision.”67 The effect of the decision was that private controllers and
processors would be allowed to “cut and paste” those SCCs into their
individual contracts, thereby imposing approved data protection obligations
on the parties when transferring data to third-party countries.68 The SCC
Decision was enacted prior to the introduction of the GDPR’s enhanced
protection language, and it was meant to address data transfers to third-party
countries that did not provide an adequate level of protection.69 Following
the Schrems II decision, the Commission, to replace the outdated SCCs,
enacted updated SCCs that incorporate a wider range of data transfer and
processing activity consistent with the GDPR.70 SCCs remain valid in
principle following Schrems II, but it is not clear how practically valid they
remain after the CJEU’s reasoning for the invalidation of the Privacy
Shield.71
65. See id. art. 46(1).
66. See id. art. 46(2)(c)–(d). Article 46 also permits other transfer tools such as binding
corporate rules (BCR), see id. art. 46(2)(b), codes of conduct, see id. art. 46(2)(e), certification
mechanisms, see id. art. 46(2)(f), or ad hoc contractual clauses, see id. art. 46(2)(a). All of the
tools available under Article 46 are contractual in nature. Because SCCs were the focus of
the CJEU’s Schrems II decision and because the CJEU and EDPB require exporters to conduct
the same analysis of the third-party country’s legislation for any of the mechanisms under
Article 46, this Note focuses on SCCs specifically, but it would be appropriate to apply the
same reasoning to any of these other tools under Article 46. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD.,
RECOMMENDATIONS 01/2020 ON MEASURES THAT SUPPLEMENT TRANSFER TOOLS TO ENSURE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE EU LEVEL OF PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA, ¶¶ 23–24 (2d ed. 2021).
67. Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the
Transfer of Personal Data to Processors Established in Third Countries Under Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5 [hereinafter SCC
Decision].
68. See id. recital 7. For example, clause 12 outlines the “Obligation after the termination
of personal data-processing services” as:
The parties agree that on the termination of the provision of data-processing
services, the data importer and the sub-processor shall, at the choice of the data
exporter, return all the personal data transferred and the copies thereof to the data
exporter or shall destroy all the personal data and certify to the data exporter that it
has done so, unless legislation imposed upon the data importer prevents it from
returning or destroying all or part of the personal data transferred. In that case, the
data importer warrants that it will guarantee the confidentiality of the personal data
transferred and will not actively process the personal data transferred anymore.
Id. cl. 12.
69. See id. at 5–6, recitals 7–8; see also Daniel Solove, The Impact of the Schrems II
Decision:
An Interview with Wim Nauwelaerts, TEACHPRIVACY (Sep. 9, 2020),
https://teachprivacy.com/the-impact-of-the-schrems-ii-decision-an-interview-with-wimnauwelaerts/ [https://perma.cc/J9BP-GYBH] (explaining SCCs and BCRs were designed for
the purpose of transferring data to “recipients in countries where the (privacy) laws do not
ensure an adequate level of protection”).
70. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914 of 4 June 2021 on Standard
Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries Pursuant to
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2021 O.J. (L 199)
31.
71. See infra Part I.C.3.
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If parties utilize Article 46 SCCs, personal data may be transferred to a
third-party country because those SCCs are the “appropriate safeguards”
implemented by the contracting parties,72 so long as the data subjects have
“enforceable” rights and “effective legal remedies.”73 The mechanisms
under Article 46, therefore, may provide an avenue for controllers and
processors to engage in safe transfers of data to third-party countries—even
when the Commission has not implemented an adequacy decision or when
the parties are not a part of an approved adequacy decision framework.74
4. “Necessity” and Other Derogations for Certain Circumstances
Lastly, the GDPR carves out a number of instances in which data transfers
may be permitted even without the protective safeguards outlined in Articles
45 and 46. These exceptions are known as “derogations.”75 The principal
carve-outs most relevant to this Note are the provisions permitting transfer
(1) when the data subject has explicitly consented to the transfer after being
informed of the potential risks76 and (2) if it is necessary to execute a contract
between the data controller and data subject or if it is in the interest of the
data subject.77
The Article 49 derogations are exemptions to the GDPR’s central objective
to ensure that personal data is only transferred to third-party countries if there
is an adequate level of protection.78 Thus, under a valid derogation, personal
data may be transferred even where protections are inadequate. Because of
this possibility, the EDPB advised that the derogations “must be interpreted
restrictively so that the exception does not become the rule.”79 So, while the
CJEU may have indicated some allowances under this provision,80 which
may provide the solution to companies following the Schrems II decision, the
EDPB has reiterated the “exceptional nature” of Article 49 and asserted that
the derogations must continue to be interpreted restrictively81 and applied
only to transfers that are “occasional and not repetitive.”82

72. See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 46(2)(c).
73. Id. art. 46(1).
74. See id.
75. Id. art. 49.
76. See id. art. 49(1)(a).
77. See id. art. 49(1)(b)–(c). Data transfers are also permitted for the public interest, see
id. art. 49(1)(d),(g), as part of a legal claim, see id. art. 49(1)(e), and when it is necessary to
protect the subject’s vital interest but the subject is unable to give consent, see id. art. 49(1)(f).
78. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., GUIDELINES 2/2018 ON DEROGATIONS OF ARTICLE 49
UNDER REGULATION 2016/679, at 4 (2018).
79. Id.
80. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 202 (July 16, 2020) (holding
that a “legal vacuum” was unlikely to result from the court’s decision because of the
parameters outlined in Article 49); see infra Part II.B.3.
81. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, at 13.
82. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 78, at 4.
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B. Relevant U.S. Surveillance Law
The CJEU’s analysis of U.S. surveillance law83 in Schrems II focuses on
three pieces of law that are most relevant to cross-border data transfers: (1)
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),84 (2)
Executive Order 12333 (“EO 12333”),85 and (3) Presidential Policy Directive
28 (PPD-28).86 A basic overview of the powers the intelligence community
derives from these laws is helpful for understanding why the CJEU
determined that the United States does not currently afford essentially
equivalent protection to EU subjects.
Congress enacted FISA in 1978 to “to authorize and regulate certain
governmental electronic surveillance of communications for foreign
intelligence purposes.”87 The statute created a process for the government to
obtain “ex parte judicial orders authorizing domestic electronic surveillance
upon a showing that, inter alia, the target of the surveillance was a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power.”88 FISA also created the FISC, which
is comprised of Article III district court judges who “hear applications for
and grant orders approving electronic surveillance.”89
FISA requires the government to obtain warrants or court orders for certain
foreign surveillance activity.90 The act also created the FISC so that the
independent judiciary could review those requests and grant the orders when
appropriate.91 Such orders can direct electronic communications service
providers to provide the public authority with access to the data that the
provider has.92
FISA also requires the U.S. Attorney General to adopt “specific
minimization procedures governing the retention and dissemination by the
[government] of [information] received . . . in response to an order.”93 These
procedures include strictly securing the data using secure networks and
restricting use of that data only for the purposes approved by the court
order.94 Programs authorized under FISA are subject to oversight by the U.S.
Department of Justice, the FISC, and Congress, as well as to audits and
program reviews by the intelligence agencies’ own internal privacy and civil
liberties officers.95
83. See infra Part I.C.2.
84. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
85. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
86. Press Release, Presidential Policy Directive—Signals Intelligence Activities (Jan. 17,
2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidentialpolicy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities [https://perma.cc/UJM8-FRT3] [hereinafter
Presidential Policy Directive].
87. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013).
88. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013).
89. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1).
90. Am. C.L. Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g)(1).
94. See Am. C.L. Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797–98 (2d Cir. 2015).
95. See id.
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EO 12333 does not compel companies involved in cross-border data
transfers to provide U.S. public authorities with that data; however, it does
permit U.S. public authorities to collect data extraterritorially, meaning data
can be intercepted while in transit prior to arriving in the United States.96 As
they relate to surveillance programs relevant to this Note, activities
conducted under EO 12333 are not governed by statute,97 nor are they subject
to judicial oversight.98
In 2014, the implementation of PPD-28 extended some protections of
FISA and EO 12333 to non-U.S. persons.99 PPD-28 states that intelligence
activities should be “as tailored as feasible.”100 While the directive is binding
on the intelligence community, it does not provide parameters or oversight
mechanisms to enforce the tailoring of those intelligence activities.101
The existing oversight mechanisms that do cover parts of these laws are
meant to hold the intelligence community accountable for its programs, but
they do not allow individuals to challenge the public authorities’ actions.102
Only the recipient of an order to disclose data under FISA has the “right [to]
judicial review of the order before the FISC.”103 However, that recipient
must also keep the order a secret; recipients cannot disclose to anyone,
including the subject of the data, their receipt of such an order.104 Congress
did not imagine that third parties, such as the subjects of the collected data,
would ever know about the existence of the court orders, much less challenge
their legality under the statute because of the deliberately secret nature of
surveillance and the prohibition on disclosure.105
In a 2013 case concerning surveillance of U.S. persons that emerged in
light of the Snowden revelations,106 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that to
96. An example of interception while in transit would be capturing the data directly from
underwater cables on the floor of the Atlantic Ocean, a tactic U.S. authorities employ under
EO 12333. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 63 (Jul. 16, 2020).
97. See id.
98. See id. ¶ 65.
99. See Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 86, § 4.
100. See id. § 1.
101. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 181.
102. See supra text accompanying note 95; Am. C.L. Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797–
98 (2d Cir. 2015).
103. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2013).
104. See id.; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d)(1) (stating that the recipient of an order to
produce data may not “disclose to any other person that the [public authority] has sought or
obtained” an order).
105. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-174, at 128, 268 (2005).
106. In 2013, Edward Snowden made classified NSA materials public, which led to more
than 120 revelations about secret U.S. government surveillance programs. Snowden
Revelations, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelations [https://perma.cc/
Z2LM-M42J] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (cataloging all revelations that emerged from
Snowden’s disclosure to date). Among the most significant were the PRISM and
UPSTREAM data collection programs, which were conducted according to FISA Section 702
and EO 12333 and which were the subject of much of the CJEU’s analysis of U.S. surveillance
law in Schrems II. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 61, 165, 179
(July 16, 2020); Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User
Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM),
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establish standing, “an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a
favorable ruling.’”107 Further, the Court “reiterated that ‘threatened injury
must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that
‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.”108 As it pertains
to the questions presented in Schrems II, if EU data subjects do not know that
their data has been improperly collected and, therefore, cannot show injury,
then they will usually lack standing to challenge any action of the U.S. public
authorities under FISA.109
To try to remedy this redress deficiency, the United States expanded the
oversight role under PPD-28 to create an ombudsperson mechanism. The
ombudsperson is a U.S. Department of State senior coordinator—at the level
of under-secretary—who receives and addresses concerns about U.S. signals
received by intelligence from foreign governments and who utilizes
compliance review mechanisms under U.S. law to ensure proper remedies
are granted.110 But the response to complaints is limited and may only alert
the individual that any noncompliance has been remedied, without more.111
Overall, the surveillance infrastructure under these three laws permits the
United States to collect the personal data of EU subjects in bulk without the
knowledge of those data subjects,112 and it does not grant non-U.S. data
subjects “actionable rights before the courts against the US authorities.”113
C. Schrems II Decision and Rationale
Whether the third-party country’s protections are “essentially equivalent
to that ensured within the Union” is the consistent lodestar the Commission
should consider when assessing the adequacy of extraterritorial data
protections under the GPDR.114 The law specifically highlights that the
third-party country should have effective independent data protection
supervision and that the data’s subjects should be afforded administrative and
judicial redress for violations of their data protection rights.115 The CJEU
emphasized these exact principles in its analysis of the Privacy Shield in
Schrems II.116 Understanding the court’s reasoning explains why its
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
[https://perma.cc/PLC4-WM9Z].
107. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
108. Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (alteration in original).
109. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 45 (July 16, 2020).
110. See Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 5, recitals 116, 120.
111. See id. recital 120.
112. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 183.
113. Id. ¶ 181.
114. GDPR, supra note 2, recital 104.
115. See id.
116. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 181 (holding that U.S. law supporting the Privacy Shield
does limit the power of U.S. authorities to implement certain surveillance programs and,
therefore, cannot ensure a level of protection “essentially equivalent” to that in the EU under
the Charter). The Privacy Shield itself was a response to an earlier CJEU ruling in Case
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declaration of the inadequacy of the Privacy Shield creates such a significant
problem and vulnerability for companies that engage in cross-border data
transfers from Europe to the United States, whether they used the Privacy
Shield or the other mechanisms available, mainly SCCs.
First, Part I.C.1 describes how the Commission initially determined the
Privacy Shield to be adequate under the GDPR. Part I.C.2 examines the
CJEU’s rationale for declaring the Privacy Shield to be inadequate. Part I.C.3
then highlights questions that have arisen over whether other GDPR data
transfer mechanisms, like SCCs, can be implemented given the CJEU’s
conclusion that the U.S. government’s surveillance abilities violate GDPR
requirements, which operate independently of the individual companies’
internal privacy and security policies.
1. The Commission’s Prior Adequacy Decision
The Privacy Shield’s status as the preferred data transfer mechanism was
secured via an adequacy decision pursuant to Article 45 of the GDPR.117 The
principles presented in the Privacy Shield were developed by the Department
of Commerce in consultation with the Commission.118 The Privacy Shield
consists of data privacy and security principles primarily concerned with
notice, choice, security, subjects’ right to access, recourse, and other
principles that the Commission determined met the GDPR’s requirements.119
Upon self-certifying and committing to the principles and obligations of the
Privacy Shield, participating companies were able to engage in cross-border
data transfers based on a pre-authorized status120—a much more efficient
process than case-by-case authorizations.
In the Privacy Shield adequacy decision, the Commission emphasized that
FISA provides some remedies that are available to non-U.S. persons.121
However, the Privacy Shield decision also acknowledged that it may be
difficult for non-U.S. individuals to establish the standing required to pursue
those remedies in U.S. courts.122 To try to remedy this deficiency, PPD-28
created an ombudsperson mechanism, as discussed in Part I.B.123
Based on these assurances from the United States about compliance, the
Commission determined that the United States ensured adequate data
protection to organizations that were part of the Privacy Shield.124 The
C-362/14, Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015), which declared the previous Safe
Harbor Framework inadequate based on similar principles applicable under the pre-GDPR
regulation.
117. See generally Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 5.
118. See id. annex II.
119. See id.
120. See id. recitals 13–14.
121. See id. recital 112 (referring to the possibility of a civil cause of action for money
damages against the United States or U.S. government officials in their personal capacities
and challenging the legality of the surveillance in the event the United States plans to use the
information gathered against the individual in proceedings in the United States).
122. See id. recital 115.
123. See id. recitals 116, 120.
124. See id. recital 136.
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Commission also acknowledged that any interference with those protections
by the U.S. public authorities for “national security, law enforcement or other
public interest purposes” could be restricted to what was “strictly necessary”
to achieve the legitimate public interest and could therefore be acceptable
because of the aforementioned legal protections against such intrusions.125
2. CJEU’s Schrems II Finding of Inadequacy
As discussed in Part I.B, the CJEU made its Schrems II determinations
based on the same three U.S. legal instruments that the Commission
considered when it initially made the Privacy Shield adequacy decision but
arrived at the opposite conclusion.126
The CJEU determined that the Commission’s adequacy decision127 was
improper because the United States does not ensure a level of protection for
personal data that is essentially equivalent to that of the EU on two
grounds.128 First, U.S. surveillance laws are overbroad and do not meet the
limited standards required under the GDPR and the principles of
proportionality and necessity in the Charter.129 Second, data subjects lack
access to appropriate redress via judicial or tribunal remedies in the United
States, as is required under the GDPR in accordance with the Charter.130
As the court highlighted with regard to its first point, and as the
Commission acknowledged in its adequacy decision, Section 702 of FISA
does not authorize individual surveillance.131 Instead, Section 702 authorizes
entire programs, and the FISC only approves the programs based on their
relation to the goal of acquiring foreign intelligence information—not on the
basis of properly targeting foreign individuals.132 As such, FISA does not
impose any limitations on the power it confers to execute broad surveillance
or address any rights or remedies for non-U.S. persons potentially targeted
by these broad surveillance powers.133 Since Section 702 does not limit its
scope, it cannot satisfy the principle of proportionality134 and, therefore,
cannot ensure a level of protection that is “essentially equivalent” with the
EU’s.135
Similarly, the court found that EO 12333 also “does not confer rights
which are enforceable” against the United States in the courts136 because that
particular legal basis for U.S. surveillance lacks any judicial redress
125. See id. recital 140.
126. See id. recitals 67–135; Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 178–84
(July 16, 2020).
127. Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 5.
128. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶¶ 180–81.
129. See id. ¶ 180.
130. See id. ¶ 181.
131. See id. ¶ 179.
132. See id.
133. See id. ¶ 180.
134. See id. ¶ 176; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
135. Id. ¶ 180.
136. Id. ¶ 182.
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mechanism.137 Therefore, the CJEU concluded that these laws taken
together with PPD-28 failed to provide the minimum safeguards that are
required under EU law’s principle of proportionality because the surveillance
programs authorized under them cannot be “limited to what is strictly
necessary.”138 Because of this failure, the CJEU concluded that the
surveillance programs cannot be “essentially equivalent” to those that are
found under EU law.139
The court maintained that, in assessing the possibility of individual
remedies, the Commission relied too heavily on the parameters outlined in
PPD-28, which limits intelligence activity to be “as tailored as feasible”140
and specifically creates an ombudsperson within the role of the senior
coordinator/undersecretary to liaise with foreign governments that may have
concerns about U.S. “signals intelligence activities.”141 However, the
creation of an ombudsperson under PPD-28 “does not grant data subjects
actionable rights before the courts against the US authorities” and “cannot
ensure a level of protection essentially equivalent to that arising from the
Charter.”142 This is because Article 47 of the Charter establishes that anyone
whose rights or freedoms are guaranteed by EU law has the right of an
effective remedy via a hearing before an “independent and impartial
tribunal.”143 The court determined that the ombudsperson did not meet this
standard based on concerns about the ombudsperson’s independence.144 The
court held that, because the ombudsperson is part of the U.S. State
Department and is appointed by the U.S. Secretary of State, the subordinate
relationship “undermine[s] the Ombudsman’s independence from the
executive.”145
In addition, the ombudsperson is not part of the independent judiciary.146
Therefore, because of the lack of rights actionable in U.S. courts against U.S.
authorities, data subjects did not have an effective remedy as required by EU
law.147 For all these reasons, the CJEU concluded the Commission’s prior
Privacy Shield decision to be invalid, nullifying the entire Privacy Shield.148
3. A Lingering Question Concerning the Validity of SCCs
While the CJEU declared the Privacy Shield invalid, the court maintained
the legitimacy of SCCs.149 The CJEU held that the SCC adequacy decision
137. See Privacy Shield Decision, supra note 5, recital 115; Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 191.
138. Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 184.
139. Id. ¶ 185.
140. Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 86, § 1(d).
141. Id. § 4(d).
142. Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 181.
143. Id. ¶ 186 (citing Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C
326) art. 47.
144. See id. ¶ 195.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. ¶ 197.
148. See id. ¶ 201.
149. See id. ¶¶ 131–32.
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itself150 does not require an assessment of any specific third-party country’s
data protection regime.151 Instead, that responsibility to assess the adequacy
of a third-party country’s legal protections falls on controllers or processors
involved in the transaction.152
The Commission’s SCC decision contains an important footnote
acknowledging that the recipient, or data importer, may have to comply with
applicable national legislation that is “not in contradiction” with SCCs, so
long as the national legislation does not go beyond what is “necessary in a
democratic society . . . to safeguard national security.”153 The court left open
the question of how exactly private data controllers and processors are to
assess whether the legislation in the third-party country stops at what is
“necessary in a democratic society.”154
The court emphasized that SCCs, being inherently contractual, cannot bind
public authorities in third-party countries because the authorities are not
parties to the contract.155 Of course, then, adequate legal protections for data
subjects in third-party countries cannot be enacted via SCCs in a private
contract.156 Therefore, to ensure the level of protection required by the
GDPR, controllers, processors, and data recipients may need to adopt
“supplementary measures” as required to “ensure compliance with that level
of protection.”157
The court failed to elaborate on just what supplemental measures or
additional safeguards private controllers could implement to ensure the
appropriate level of data protection for European subjects.158 Part II of this
Note examines some proposed safeguards. However, without direction from
the court, commentators note that it is unclear if any privately added
safeguard can rectify the inadequacy of the data subject protections in the
United States, particularly for the problem of a lack of a judicial remedy.159
The CJEU’s analysis of U.S. surveillance law under the Privacy Shield
decision is equally applicable to the use of SCCs for firms transferring private

150. See generally SCC Decision, supra note 67.
151. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 130.
152. See id. ¶ 134.
153. SCC Decision, supra note 67, cl. 5 n.1.
154. Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 141.
155. See id. ¶ 125.
156. See id. ¶ 132.
157. Id. ¶ 133.
158. See Christopher Kuner, The Schrems II Judgment of the Court of Justice and the
Future of Data Transfer Regulation, EUROPEAN L. BLOG (July 17, 2020),
https://europeanlawblog.eu/2020/07/17/the-schrems-ii-judgment-of-the-court-of-justice-andthe-future-of-data-transfer-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/CH3X-MZ8S] (noting the court
suggested “using ‘supplementary measures’ . . . to protect data under the SCCs, but d[id] not
explain what measures these could be” (quoting Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 133)).
159. See Jennifer Daskal, What Comes Next: The Aftermath of European Court’s Blow to
Transatlantic Data Transfers, JUST SEC. (July 17, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71485/
what-comes-next-the-aftermath-of-european-courts-blow-to-transatlantic-data-transfers/
[https://perma.cc/BA7S-TP25] (noting there is “nothing that companies can do to provide the
kind of back-end judicial review that the Court demands”).
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data to the United States.160 Therefore, one commentator notes that the court
would hold that SCCs alone will not work for those transfers without
additional provisions.161 This remains the case as the updated SCCs also
require exporters to assess the third-party country’s surveillance laws and
practices to determine what protections may be warranted.162 Then the
question is: What additional safeguards can data controllers and processors
take, in practice, to ensure compliance with the level of protection mandated
by EU law?163
II. PRACTICAL PATHS FORWARD IN THE POST-SCHREMS II LANDSCAPE
In Schrems II, the CJEU declined to allow the Privacy Shield to remain in
place while a new solution was developed.164 The court reasoned that a
“legal vacuum” was unlikely in the wake of its decision because of the
appropriate safeguards available under Articles 46 and 49 of the GDPR,
which provide conditions defining when transfers may take place without an
adequacy decision.165 However, without concrete assurance from European
authorities about what additional appropriate safeguards will be considered
acceptable in accordance with Article 46 or about how necessity or consent
principles from Article 49 could be utilized for ongoing activity, thousands
of companies are currently trying to navigate their way through this
confusing legal landscape.166
The questionable legitimacy of using SCCs to transfer data to the United
States is especially troublesome because SCCs “were specifically designed
to transfer personal data outside of the EEA, to recipients in countries where
the (privacy) laws do not ensure an adequate level of protection.”167 As a
result, companies and thought leaders are trying to find immediate practical
solutions that will permit continued operations without business delays, as
well as considering long-term structural reform to provide more stability and
protection between the regions.168 Part II.A outlines the regulatory guidance
160. See Daniel Solove, Schrems II: Reflections on the Decision and Next Steps,
TEACHPRIVACY (July 23, 2020), https://teachprivacy.com/schrems-ii-reflections-on-thedecision-and-next-steps/ [https://perma.cc/JYN3-F6XP] (noting that the “SCC don’t really
survive, at least not for the US” after Schrems II and that “the SCC cannot work as a means to
transfer EU personal data to the US without some kind of additional protections against US
government surveillance”).
161. See id.
162. See Kenneth Propp, Progress on Transatlantic Data Transfers?: The Picture After
the US-EU Summit, LAWFARE (June 25, 2021, 10:16 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
progress-transatlantic-data-transfers-picture-after-us-eu-summit
[https://perma.cc/QJT3A4AK].
163. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶ 137.
164. See id. ¶ 202.
165. Id.; see supra Parts I.A.3–4.
166. See Statement on Schrems II Ruling, supra note 10 (noting that more than 5300
companies relied on the Privacy Shield).
167. Solove, supra note 69 (describing this transfer scenario as the “raison d’être!” for
SCCs and BCRs).
168. See Nick Clegg, Securing the Long Term Stability of Cross-Border Data Flows,
FACEBOOK (Sep. 9, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/securing-the-long-term-
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to date. Parts II.B and II.C then explore the proposed solutions that data
exporters and recipients are implementing.
A. The EU and U.S. Regulatory Response to Schrems II
Immediately following the CJEU’s decision in Schrems II, the EDPB
issued guidance that emphasized the holding and stated that it would provide
more guidance in the future.169 In the interim, the EDPB did provide some
basic guidance emphasizing the CJEU’s holding that in order to utilize SCCs
to transfer data to the United States, the data exporters and importers must
make independent assessments regarding the adequacy of the data protection
provided by the SCCs and provide necessary supplementary measures.170
The board emphasized that it was “looking further into what these
supplementary measures could consist of and will provide more guidance,”
but the board did not provide a timetable for that guidance.171 In June 2021,
nearly a year after Schrems II was decided, the EDPB issued final
recommendations to European exporters.172
In the United States, the Department of Commerce issued guidance stating
that while the Privacy Shield was invalid for the purposes of meeting GDPR
standards, the obligations of the participants under the Privacy Shield were
still intact.173 The Department of Commerce explained that part of the
purpose of maintaining the obligations and enforcement of the Privacy Shield
was to allow organizations to demonstrate their “serious commitment to

stability-of-cross-border-data-flows/ [https://perma.cc/6XZY-ASRY]; Marc Zwillinger et al.,
Supplementing SCCs to Solve Surveillance Shortfalls, ZWILLGEN (June 10, 2021),
https://www.zwillgen.com/international/supplementing-sccs-solve-surveillance-shortfalls/
[https://perma.cc/DDZ5-8777].
169. Press Release, EDPS Statement Following the Court of Justice Ruling in Case
C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximilian Schrems
(“Schrems II”) (July 17, 2020), https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/pressreleases/2020/edps-statement-following-court-justice-ruling-case_en
[https://perma.cc/99W2-L697].
170. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 11, at 1, 3, 5.
171. Id. at 5.
172. See generally, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66. The EDPB issued draft
guidance in November 2020 and solicited comments from the public through December 21,
2020, which were considered for the final recommendations that were published in June 2021.
See Recommendations 01/2020 on Measures that Supplement Transfer Tools to Ensure
Compliance with the EU Level of Protection of Personal Data, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD.,
https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/documents/public-consultations/2020/
recommendations-012020-measures-supplement_en [https://perma.cc/XUB9-NPY2] (last
visited Aug. 9, 2021). The analysis in this Note is based on the June 2021 recommendations,
as those recommendations are the most recent guidance available. See EDPB Adopts Final
Version of Recommendations on Supplementary Measures, Letter to EU Institutions on the
Privacy and Data Protection Aspects of a Possible Digital Euro, and Designates Three EDPB
Members to the ETIAS Fundamental Rights Guidance Board, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD
(June
21,
2021),
https://edpb.europa.eu/news/news/2021/edpb-adopts-final-versionrecommendations-supplementary-measures-letter-eu_en [https://perma.cc/CG72-XNCZ].
173. See Statement on Schrems II Ruling, supra note 10.
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protect personal information” in a way that offers “meaningful privacy
protections and recourse for EU individuals.”174
The Department of Commerce and the Commission confirmed that the
institutions have initiated discussions to explore the potential for an enhanced
Privacy Shield to comply with the needs emphasized in Schrems II.175
However, it remains unclear when such an agreement could happen.176 As
Professor Daniel Solove highlights, based on the CJEU’s reasoning, any new
framework would involve at least some changes to U.S. surveillance law to
accommodate for the current deficiencies.177
In addition, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, and
the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence jointly issued a white
paper emphasizing that, for the vast majority of parties, U.S. intelligence
authorities are not interested in the data they transfer or collect.178 The white
paper provides an “up-to-date and contextualized discussion” of the relevant
U.S. intelligence surveillance laws that companies relying on SCCs can use
in their own assessments.179 That discussion provides support for companies
to take a risk-based approach to their cross-border data transfers by
articulating that the overwhelming majority of transfers are of no interest to
the U.S. intelligence agencies and that most companies have never received
an order for data under FISA 702.180
In the final draft guidance, the EDPB may indicate openness to such a
risk-based approach.181 The recommendations are meant to provide
exporters with steps to follow to assess whether a third-party country’s laws
may impinge on the data subjects’ rights,182 and if so, potential supplemental
174. FAQs–EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Program Update, PRIV. SHIELD FRAMEWORK (Mar. 31,
2021), https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=EU-U-S-Privacy-Shield-Program-Update
[https://perma.cc/46CQ-BVPE].
175. See Statement on Schrems II Ruling, supra note 10.
176. See Propp, supra note 162 (highlighting the generic statements and the hope that there
will be some agreement by the end of 2021).
177. See Solove, supra note 160 (noting any new framework would have to “provide a lot
of limitations on government surveillance involving EU personal data, plus a right to pursue
remedies in court”); see also Propp, supra note 162 (emphasizing the sides remain “far apart”
on the lack of independent oversight and redress available in the United States).
178. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM. ET AL., INFORMATION ON U.S. PRIVACY SAFEGUARDS
RELEVANT TO SCCS AND OTHER EU LEGAL BASES FOR EU-U.S. DATA TRANSFERS AFTER
SCHREMS
II
1
(2020),
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/202009/SCCsWhitePaperFORMATTEDFINAL508COMPLIANT.PDF [https://perma.cc/Q24LE3KY].
179. Id.
180. See id. at 2–3 (explaining that businesses would have no basis on which to believe that
U.S. intelligence agencies would seek to collect data from transfers involving ordinary
business activity like “employee, customer, or sales records” and adding that “[i]ndeed, the
overwhelming majority of companies have never received orders to disclose data under FISA
702 and have never otherwise provided personal data to U.S. intelligence agencies”).
181. See Theodore Christakis, “Schrems III”?: First Thoughts on the EDPB Post-Schrems
II Recommendations on International Data Transfers (Part 2), EUROPEAN L. BLOG (Nov. 16,
2020), https://europeanlawblog.eu/2020/11/16/schrems-iii-first-thoughts-on-the-edpb-postschrems-ii-recommendations-on-international-data-transfers-part-2/
[https://perma.cc/4HMY-D6YD].
182. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, at 3.
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measures183 that they may choose to implement so that the protection is
essentially equivalent to that of the EU.184
In this guidance, the EDPB advises that if an exporter still wishes to
proceed with a data transfer to a country lacking legislation clearly governing
the circumstances in which public authorities may access the data, then those
exporters may consider the “practices of the third country’s public
authorities” to help determine if the safeguards will sufficiently protect the
personal data transferred.185 Therefore, to inform what supplemental
measures, if any, may be used, the EDPB appears to be amenable to an
exporter’s assessment, considering not only the rights and laws that exist but
also the discretion that the public authorities of the third-party country may
exercise in enforcing the laws.186
The EDPB’s guidance proposes supplemental measures that exporters and
importers may choose to implement to establish essentially equivalent
protections for data subjects.187 However, the guidance reiterates that it is
exporters’ duty to perform an assessment of the protections in the third-party
country and implement appropriate protections.188 The EDPB’s guidance is
meant to clarify the process for European exporters,189 but it does not make
any conclusions about which, if any, of the supplemental recommendations
may be used to establish the required level of data protection for transfers
from the EU to the United States.190
The result is that the main regulatory authorities on both sides of the
Atlantic have made it very clear that the Privacy Shield is not valid for GDPR
compliance, but the regulatory authorities lack a viable replacement solution.
Without an official adequacy decision under Article 45, private entities must
determine the level of protection in a third-party country and then determine
and implement measures that they believe will provide essentially equivalent
data protections.

183. See infra Part II.B.
184. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, at 3.
185. Id. ¶ 43.
186. See id. ¶ 43.3.
187. See generally id.
188. See id. at 3 (emphasizing the CJEU’s holding in Schrems II that “controllers or
processors, acting as exporters, are responsible for verifying, on a case-by-case basis and,
where appropriate, in collaboration with the importer in the third country, if the law or practice
of the third country impinges on the effectiveness of the appropriate safeguards contained in
the [GDPR transfer mechanism]”).
189. See id. (stating “[t]hese recommendations provide exporters with a series of steps to
follow, potential sources of information, and some examples of supplementary measures that
could be put in place”).
190. The EDPB’s guidance merely states that when identifying and implementing a
supplemental measure, the exporter “may ultimately find that no supplementary measure can
ensure an essentially equivalent level of protection for [the exporter’s] specific transfer,”
thereby avoiding any conclusory holdings that any of the suggested recommendations may
ensure adequate data protection. Id. at 4.
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B. Addressing the Reach of U.S. Surveillance
Schrems II articulated that the existing surveillance systems in the United
States do not allow European data subjects to enjoy protection that is
essentially equivalent to that which is available in the EU.191 However, it
also clearly articulated that private parties may be able to implement
supplemental measures that, in practice, may provide adequate protection.192
Yet, such private obligations do not bind the public authorities in the
respective third-party country.193
Because the regulatory bodies in the EU and United States are unable to
quickly resolve the misalignment between fundamental rights in the EU and
surveillance law in the United States, private entities are forced to find
alternative bases or methods for transferring personal data from Europe to
the United States to continue their operations with minimal interruption. The
technological enhancements, additional contractual provisions, or use of a
different mechanism entirely in the EDPB’s draft recommendations, all
utilize private law to attempt to avoid the overbroad reach of U.S.
surveillance law and provide essentially equivalent protection, as required by
the GDPR.194
Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 consider, respectively, the technological and
organizational changes that companies are implementing as legal solutions
to mitigate risk of personal data being captured by U.S. intelligence agencies.
Part II.B.3 assesses the utilization of consent and necessity derogation
methods under Article 49 as a means to transfer data to the United States.
Part II.B.4 explores contractual legal supplements that attempt to enhance
compliance closer to the GDPR’s requirements.
1. Encryption
Perhaps the most immediately actionable protection companies can take to
enhance their SCCs is the utilization of robust encryption when personal data
is transferred to U.S. firms. Such technical measures can make accessing
data more difficult, in practice, for public authorities in the United States.195
Even if the authorities do access the data, tokenization could render the data
meaningless to those other than the controller and recipient—and may be
more helpful.196

191. See supra Part I.C.2.
192. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 133–34 (July 16, 2020).
193. See id. ¶¶ 125, 132.
194. See generally EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66.
195. See Solove, supra note 69.
196. See Ruth Boardman & Ariane Mole, Schrems II: Privacy Shield Invalid, SCCs
Survive. What Happens Now?, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2020, at 3, 6 (2020).
Tokenization is the process of turning a piece of data into a random string of characters called
a token that has no meaningful value if breached because there is no key that can be used to
derive the original date, unlike encryption which uses a mathematical process to transform the
sensitive information into the encrypted data. See Tokenization vs Encryption, MCAFEE,
https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/security-awareness/cloud/tokenization-vs-
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These technical measures change the personal data such that it is useless
if breached and so may be employed as a legal solution to provide effective
protection against intelligence authorities’ ability to access the data. The
EDPB’s final recommendation provides guidance regarding technical
measures, including data encryption or pseudonymization,197 and when they
may or may not provide sufficient supplemental protection.198 According to
that guidance, the potential suitability of technical measures hinges on
whether the public authorities in third-party countries will be able to identify
or know information about the specific data subjects.199 The EDPB’s
recommendations are meant to be applicable200 whether the public authority
in the third-party country accesses the data from the lines of communications
themselves201 (similar to how U.S. authorities access data in accordance with
EO 12333)202 or if the intended data importer is required to turn the data over
to the authorities203 (similar to the obligations of electronic communications
providers under Section 702 of FISA).204
The EDPB outlined five use cases where the technical measures employed
may provide adequate protection.205 In four of the five adequate scenarios,
the technical measures are deemed adequate because the processor or
importer in the third-party country has access to neither the unprotected data
nor the keys needed to unprotect the data in order to perform its processing
task.206 These four scenarios are: (1) when an exporter stores encrypted data
in the third-party country for backup or other purposes, but the importer does
not need to access that data “in the clear” (i.e., unencrypted, not
pseudonymized, decryption keys transported to the importer or a vulnerable
party);207 (2) where pseudonymized data is transferred to the importer for
analysis but without the information necessary to attribute the data to specific
subjects;208 (3) when the data is accessible by public authorities while in
transit;209 and (4) when the processing of the data is split or among multiple
parties in different jurisdictions.210 In each of these scenarios neither the
unencrypted or de-pseudonymized data nor the keys to unencrypt or
encryption.html [https://perma.cc/X26H-HM7T] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). The technical
details of encryption and tokenization are beyond the scope of this Note.
197. Pseudonymization means the processing of personal data such that it can no longer be
attributed to a specific data subject on its own without additional information, which is kept
separately so the data is not attributable to an identifiable person. GDPR, supra note 2, art.
4(5).
198. EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 77.
199. See id. ¶ 79.
200. See id. ¶ 81.
201. See id. ¶ 80(a).
202. See supra Part I.B.
203. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 80(b).
204. See supra Part I.B.
205. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶¶ 84–92.
206. See id.
207. Id. ¶ 84.
208. See id. ¶ 85.
209. See id. ¶ 90.
210. See id. ¶ 92.
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de-pseudonymize the data are accessible to the public authorities. The fifth
use case occurs when the data importer is specifically protected by the
third-party country’s laws, such that the importer is protected from having to
disclose the personal data to the public authorities.211 If that is the case, the
importer may have the decryption key but must still make sure to use state of
the art end-to-end encryption and/or pseudonymization so that the public
authorities cannot access the sensitive data in transit.212
Therefore, the EDPB determination of legal adequacy based on technical
measures appears to be based primarily on the secured or unsecured nature
of the data when in the third-party country. If (1) the data is encrypted or
pseudonymized prior to transfer, (2) the decryption keys are not transferred
to the importer or any vulnerable party within the third-party country, and (3)
the encryption is state-of-the-art such that the public authorities in the
third-party country would not be able to determine any personal information
about the protected data subjects, then the EDPB is likely to consider the
technical action an effective supplemental measure, under the GDPR, that
the exporter could contract for and implement to execute cross-border data
transfers.213
Conversely, if (1) the importer/processor in the third-party country
requires access to the data “in the clear” in order to execute its task, (2) the
laws of the third-party country that grant public authorities to the transferred
data go “beyond what is necessary and proportionate in a democratic
society,”214 and (3) the laws are applied in practice to the transfers in
question, then the EDPB is “incapable of envisioning an effective technical
measure to prevent that access from infringing on the data subject’s
fundamental rights.”215 As the EDPB emphasizes, in scenarios where
unencrypted personal data of EU data subjects are technically necessary for
the importer to execute its tasks, any level of encryption will not be an
effective supplementary measure capable of “ensur[ing] an essentially
equivalent level of protection if the data importer is in possession of the
cryptographic keys.”216
Professor Theodore Christakis explains that the EDPB’s use cases from
the earlier draft recommendations suggest that the transfers will be accepted
“only if the data are rendered non-readable for the importer in the recipient
country.”217 The EDPB’s explanation of two situations where technical
measures would likely not be acceptable emphasizes the strict acceptability
of technical measures alone.218 The first suggests that an exporter could not
use a cloud service provider to process data in a third-party country, while
the second considers that an exporter could not make personal data available
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See id. ¶ 91.
See id.
See id. ¶¶ 84, 85, 90, 92.
See id. ¶¶ 94(3), 96(3).
Id. ¶¶ 94, 96.
Id. ¶¶ 95, 97.
See Christakis, supra note 181.
See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶¶ 93–97.
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to parties in a third-party country, such as a “branch of the same company or
subcontractors,” to be utilized for a shared business purpose.219 As Professor
Omer Tene highlights, the lack of acceptability for these two scenarios may
not solve the problem as much as they add to it because they “account[] for
the vast majority of real world transfers.”220
These analyses were conducted based on the draft recommendations, not
the final recommendations published in June 2021. The major development
is that the EDPB’s final guidance permits exporters to consider how the law
or authority impacts the transfer in practice as part of its assessment.221 That
could lead those exporters to conclude that while the laws of the third country
violate EEA principles, they do not affect this transfer in practice and the
supplemental measures may thus be permissible.222
Therefore, technical measures may constitute a supplementary measure
that ensures the adequate level of protection as required by EU law under
certain circumstances, but companies may have to bolster those
supplementary measures with other mechanisms to reinforce the protections.
2. Data Localization
Another potential solution is to avoid the transfers altogether by localizing
data storage exclusively in Europe.223 If no data transfer occurs, then firms
do not need to utilize an adequate mechanism; however, it has been suggested
that, while the solution may appear to be adequate in the short term, this idea
likely is not compatible with the global needs of firms who transfer data
anyway.224
One commentator, Professor Anupam Chander, explains that, practically
speaking, localizing data fails to actually keep data local.225 Data transfers
happen on such a large global scale because businesses operate on a global
scale.226 Therefore, even if EU data is stored and maintained in Europe,
customer service representatives based outside of the EU will still be able to
access that data; similarly, if Facebook stores an EU subject’s profile on
servers in Ireland, peers in the United States and elsewhere will still be able
to access the profile.227 In addition, because the internet is international, an
EU subject accessing EU-stored data may attain that access after being routed
219. See Christakis, supra note 181 (referring to the scenarios in the earlier draft EDPB
Recommendations of 2020, which are copied nearly verbatim in the final version discussed in
this Note).
220. Omer Tene, Quick Reaction to EDPB Schrems II Guidance, LINKEDIN (Nov. 12,
2020), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/quick-reaction-edpb-schrems-ii-guidance-omer-tene
[https://perma.cc/9K9Z-TQZ9].
221. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 30.
222. See id. at 20–21.
223. See Solove, supra note 160 (suggesting one path forward is for companies to “try to
keep the data in the EU”).
224. See generally Anupam Chander, Is Data Localization a Solution for Schrems II?, 23
J. INT’L ECON. L. 771 (2020).
225. See id. at 781–82.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 781.
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through the United States, or elsewhere, so cross-border data transfers still
occur.228 Jurisdictions could erect systems or firewalls to avoid such routing,
but that would substantially increase costs for internet access generally,
reducing the value of the service overall.229
Second, there are legitimate questions about whether localization would
align with the purpose of the Schrems II decision. The court ruled that
existing transfers to the United States were not permitted because U.S.
surveillance law fails to provide adequate protection for EU subjects.230 But
U.S. surveillance also occurs outside of the geographical boundaries of the
United States and is less restrained abroad.231
Despite these potential shortcomings, some companies started to use
localization in the aftermath of the decision.232 For example, France’s health
data hub has not only moved to data localization but also discontinued using
Microsoft’s cloud service (which could still operate in the EU) to avoid being
subject to U.S. surveillance law under Section 702 of FISA.233
3. Necessity or Consent
In Schrems II, the CJEU indicated that Article 49 of the GDPR provides at
least a short-term solution for companies that rely on the legitimacy of
transferring personal data from Europe to the United States.234 The two
potentially relevant avenues available under Article 49 are necessity or
consent.235 Part II.B.3.a and Part II.B.3.b discuss necessity and consent as
possible justifications for data transfers.

228.
229.
230.
231.

See id. at 782.
See id.
See supra Part I.C.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1881–1885c; Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64
EMORY L.J. 677, 714–18 (2015). Also, while comparisons of the U.S. surveillance rules to
those of other countries are beyond the scope of this Note, it is worthwhile to recognize that
many European countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands all have robust surveillance operations in Europe, so localizing the data may not
even solve the underlying concern of improperly protected surveillance. See Chander, supra
note 224, at 778.
232. Indeed, prior to the EDPB’s general guidance in November 2020, German DPAs
advised exporters in that member state that data encryption with key localization was likely
the only way to comply with the Schrems II holding. See Annette Demmel & Mareike Lucht,
German DPA Issues Guidance on Schrems II and the Transfer of Personal Data to Non-EU
Countries, NAT’L L. REV. (Sep. 23, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/germandpa-issues-guidance-schrems-ii-and-transfer-personal-data-to-non-eu-countries
[https://perma.cc/2FQA-XETR].
233. Romain Dillet, France’s Health Data Hub to Move to European Cloud Infrastructure
to Avoid EU-US Data Transfers, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 12, 2020, 1:48 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/12/frances-health-data-hub-to-move-to-european-cloudinfrastructure-to-avoid-eu-us-data-transfers/ [https://perma.cc/5DYM-53BK].
234. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 202 (July 16, 2020) (stating
that a “legal vacuum” was unlikely to result from the court’s decision because of the
parameters outlined in Article 49).
235. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
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a. Seeking Legitimacy by Necessity
Since the Schrems II decision, Facebook has adopted the necessity
approach after being notified by Ireland’s Data Protection Commission to
stop using SCCs.236 In response to an inquiry from NOYB (a consumer
privacy advocacy group initiated by Maximillian Schrems)237 about if and
how Facebook transfers user data outside of the EU, Facebook said the legal
basis for doing such transfers was that they were “necessary to provide
[Facebook’s] contractual services.”238 Therefore, it appears that since the
Schrems II decision, Facebook now relies on Article 49 of the GDPR as the
legal basis for its cross-border data transfers, despite the fact that previous
EDPB guidance stated that necessity cannot be used for systemic transfers,
only “occasional” transfers.239 It is accepted, however, that actions like
booking a flight or hotel in the United States or sending an email to the United
States would be derogations for necessity.240 So then, Professor Chander
questions whether communicating with peers in the United States via
Facebook is a similar activity that could be justified by the same
reasoning?241 That question remains unanswered, but Professor Chander
emphasizes the EDPB’s guidance, which reiterates that Article 49 transfers,
including necessity, are “narrowly construed.”242
b. Seeking Legitimacy by Consent
Obtaining data subjects’ consent to transfer their data is the other avenue
presented by Article 49 that seems viable for some businesses. However,
Professor Chander notes that the burden for consent is quite high under the
GDPR.243 First, consent from the subject must be “specific, informed, and
unambiguous.”244 The subject must also be able to withdraw her consent at
any time.245 Second, the costs of acquiring such complete and adequate

236. See Clegg, supra note 168 (stating that Ireland’s Data Protection Commission “has
suggested that SCCs cannot in practice be used for EU-US data transfers”).
237. Our
Detailed
Concept,
NOYB,
https://noyb.eu/en/our-detailed-concept
[https://perma.cc/4AXL-ESYH] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
238. NOYB, OPENING PANDORA’S BOX: HOW COMPANIES ADDRESSED OUR QUESTIONS
ABOUT THEIR INTERNATIONAL DATA TRANSFERS AFTER THE CJEU’S RULING IN C-311/18–
SCHREMS II 18 (2020), https://noyb.eu/files/web/Replies_from_controllers_on_EUUS_transfers.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SSY-Q28P].
239. EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 78, at 9; EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra
note 11, at 4.
240. Next Steps for Users & FAQs, NOYB (July 24, 2020), https://noyb.eu/en/next-stepsusers-faqs [https://perma.cc/6XUH-9UZZ].
241. Chander, supra note 224, at 776.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See GDPR, supra note 2, art. 4(11).
245. See International Transfers After the UK Exit from the EU Implementation Period,
INFO. COMM’R OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-tothe-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/international-transfers/ [https://perma.cc/UNC7GFE2] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
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consent from every applicable data subject will be quite high.246 Third, while
there is some basis for the assertion that consent, unlike necessity, may be
used for repeated, ongoing transfers,247 that theory has also been refuted by
earlier EDPB direction248 and reiterated by subsequent EDPB guidance.249
If either of these Article 49 derogations are acceptable, questions about the
scope of their applicability are still open because they are likely to be more
suitable for consumer-facing companies executing direct transactions with
consumers, rather than any company that deals in cross-border data transfers.
4. Supplemental Clauses
While the Schrems II court did not specify what “additional safeguards”
companies could implement when they determine the protections of a
third-party country are insufficient,250 some companies are providing
supplemental contractual provisions (in addition to the new SCCs) that
attempt to counter specific deficiencies.251 Indeed, the EDPB’s final June
2021 recommendations assess a number of supplemental contractual
provisions that may provide adequate supplemental measures,252 including
transparency disclosure obligations,253 technical protections or procedural
challenges,254 and opportunities to empower the data subjects to enforce their
rights.255
A core issue of Schrems II was the public authorities’ access to data. Since
the authorities are not bound by contractual terms, it is difficult to see how
additional terms that only bind the contracting parties and not the authorities
would be useful.256 Therefore, the EDPB advises that private contractual
obligations would likely need to be combined with other technical or
organizational solutions in order to be considered adequate measures.257 For
example, additional contractual provisions will not rule out the possible
application of FISA Section 702, which may oblige an electronic
communications provider or importer in the United States to comply with
orders to disclose data it receives to the public authorities.258 Because the
246. See Chander, supra note 224, at 776.
247. Stéphanie Faber, Does the GDPR Allow for the Use of Consent for the International
Transfer of Data?, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/doesgdpr-allow-use-consent-international-transfer-data [https://perma.cc/LXN5-RSNM].
248. See generally EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 78.
249. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 25.
250. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 134 (July 16, 2020).
251. See Zwillinger et al., supra note 168 (explaining that ZwillGen, a Washington,
D.C.-based law firm that specializes in data-related legal questions, has worked with clients
to implement supplemental clauses following the Schrems II decision).
252. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, at 36–43.
253. See infra Part II.B.4.a.
254. See infra Part II.B.4.b.
255. See infra Part II.C.1.
256. See Boardman & Mole, supra note 196, at 6.
257. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 99 (citing Schrems II, C-311/18
¶ 125).
258. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 101 (citing Schrems II, C-311/18,
¶ 132).
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EDPB’s recommendations are for exporters assessing transfers to third-party
countries generally and not specifically for data transfers moving from the
EU to the United States,259 it is critical to determine if the recommendations
can be utilized so that those transferring data to the United States can do so
while providing data protection essentially equivalent to that of the EU.
Even so, additional contractual measures recommended by the EDPB can
create enhanced obligations that may be used to help establish protections
that are essentially equivalent to those of the EU. Part II.B.4.a examines
potential transparency obligations.260 Part II.B.4.b analyzes potential
obligations for the importers to take specific actions261 or use specific
technical measures.262 Then, Part II.B.4.c considers recommendations that
may empower data subjects to exercise rights to redress.263
a. Transparency Obligations
The EDPB recommends several potential contractual terms that would
require importers to disclose to exporters, based on their best efforts, the
public authorities’ access to data.264 Such proactive disclosure would help
the exporter with its task of assessing the level of protection in the third-party
country.265
The information to be disclosed could include the laws and regulations of
the third-party country that would permit public authorities’ access and
define the scope of that access.266 These terms could also require importers
to disclose any and all requests that they may have previously received from
public authorities seeking access to the relevant data and to disclose how they
complied.267 In addition, the exporter may seek to include clauses where the
importer certifies it has not deliberately created “back doors” that could be
used by the public authorities to access data and that the law does not require
them to create any mechanisms that would facilitate such access for the
public authorities.268 These additional contractual protections, which limit
the risk of U.S. public authorities that actually acquire the personal data, may
satisfy the essentially equivalent protection requirement of the GDPR.269
Unlike FISA Section 702, EO 12333 does not have the authority to compel
companies involved in cross-border data transfers to provide U.S. public

259. See generally EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66.
260. See id. at 37.
261. See id. at 40.
262. See id. at 36.
263. See id. at 42.
264. See id. ¶ 105.
265. See id.
266. See id. ¶ 106(1).
267. See id. ¶ 106(4).
268. See id. ¶ 109.
269. See Zwillinger et al., supra note 168 (asserting that the essential equivalence standard
is consistently assessed under the GDPR based on a risk-based approach, like in Article 32
and Article 25).
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authorities with that data.270 Instead, cooperation by any private company
under the executive order is purely voluntary.271 Therefore, U.S. companies
can make contractual promises about how they will or will not assist the U.S.
government with surveillance.272 Promising not to assist under EO 12333
could provide some assurance to the EU party of enhanced data protection.
FISA Section 702, however, does provide some authority to compel a U.S.
company’s cooperation.273 However, even that authority may be limited by
contractual assurances. First, not all data operators are eligible to receive
such a directive from the U.S. government compelling disclosure of the
relevant personal data; only electronic communication service providers can
receive such a command.274 Therefore, many U.S. data importers could
provide contractual assurances to the EU exporter of their ineligibility and
provide assurances that any such directive would be fought to the fullest
extent possible.275
If an importer is an electronic communication service provider, it may still
achieve essentially equivalent protection by making assurances that it has
never been issued such a directive (as appears to be the case for the majority
of firms)276 and that even if such a directive is issued, it will use any and all
available judicial mechanisms to fight that directive.277 Further, if it has
complied with a directive, the importer could promise to include the number
and volume of affected users in transparency reports that can be made
available to the EU firm. The EU firm could then compare that information
to the total volume of users’ data it exports, enabling it to make an informed
risk assessment that could justify the continued transfers.278
Alternatively, rather than relying on the importers’ assurances, exporters
may seek access to the importers’ processing logs to determine for
themselves if any data has been disclosed to public authorities.279 Such
audits were already permitted under the earlier SCCs between controllers and
processors280 or could be executed via alternative Article 46 mechanisms like
certification or a code of conduct.281
The EDPB’s final transparency recommendation is a contractual measure
that establishes a “warrant canary.”282 This term would commit the importer

270. See supra Part I.B.
271. See Zwillinger et al., supra note 168 (highlighting that EO 12333 “provides no
mechanism for forcing importers to assist the government”).
272. See id. (explaining that “importers can contractually commit to not voluntarily assist
the government in conducting operations under EO 12333”).
273. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
274. See Zwillinger et al., supra note 168.
275. See id.
276. See id. (highlighting that at the time of the Snowden revelations, it was reported that
fewer than 10 companies were receiving such Section 702 orders).
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 111.
280. SCC Decision, supra note 67, cl. 5(f).
281. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 111 n.96.
282. See id. ¶ 116.
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to publishing regularly (perhaps at least daily) a “cryptographically signed
message” to the exporter that, as of that date and time, the importer has not
received any request or order for protected data.283 Under such a scheme,
the absence of this message could indicate to the exporter that the situation
has changed.284 In order for this to be effective for transfers to the United
States, the critical question is whether FISA’s prohibition on disclosure
would apply such “passive notification.”285 It is not clear whether such an
action would constitute improper disclosure under Section 702.
No matter what transparency clauses may or may not be effective for
transfers to the United States, it is likely necessary that they also include
obligations for importers to take certain actions with respect to protecting the
transferred data.
b. The Obligation to Take Specific Actions
In addition to providing mechanisms for importers to disclose any access
public authorities have gained, the parties could institute contractual
measures to ensure actions on the part of the importer. Should the parties
find technical measures are warranted,286 the contract should indicate which
measures are required for the transfers to take place287 so that both parties
commit to the supplemental measure.288 In the event that an importer in the
United States is eventually served with an order to disclose data to the public
authorities, the importer may commit to challenge complying with the order
to the best of its ability.289
C. Addressing Individual Redress in the United States
While the EDPB and private industry recommend and utilize what they
believe are permissible supplemental measures that limit the accessibility of
one’s data to what is necessary and proportionate as required under EU law,
the second prong of the CJEU’s reason for finding inadequacy—the lack of
individual redress before an independent body—must also be addressed.
This part assesses two main avenues that have been proposed to remedy that
deficiency. Part II.C.1 briefly examines the EDPB’s proposed private
contractual solutions meant to enable the individual to exercise his or her
rights. Part II.C.2 examines a proposal to make a moderate modification to
FISA to provide a mechanism for individual redress before an independent
judiciary.

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See id.
See id.
See id. ¶ 117.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 103.
See id. ¶ 104.
See id. ¶ 118.
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1. Empowering Data Subjects to Exercise Rights
In addition to the supplemental measures explored in Part II.B, which may
be employed to mitigate the risk of public authorities gaining access to
subjects’ data,290 the EDPB’s final recommendations from June 2021 include
measures that may assist the data subjects in exercising their rights to
redress.291 These measures include obligations for the importer and/or
exporter to notify the data subject when public authorities of a third-party
country request or order access to their data or when the importer can no
longer comply with the contractual commitments protecting the data for
whatever reason.292 They also include committing to assist the data subject
in their exercise of their rights in the third-party country, so long as the
country provides for redress.293 The effectiveness of both of these measures
depends on the rights to redress in the third-party country and the importer’s
ability to disclose the request or order in the first place.294
2. Statutory Change to Enable Redress
In Schrems II, the CJEU noted that the relevant U.S. surveillance programs
conducted under Section 702 of FISA and EO 12333 do not allow the
subjects of the surveillance meaningful or actionable redress before “an
independent and impartial court.”295 Similar reasoning was given as part of
why Schrems I invalidated the earlier Safe Harbor Framework296 and why
the ombudsperson mechanism was developed as part of the Privacy
Shield.297 However, the CJEU observed that the ombudsperson, as under
secretary of state, was part of the executive branch, not independent from it,
and could not take actions to bind the intelligence community.298
To adequately address what the CJEU perceives as deficiencies in judicial
redress, some commentators argue that the United States will have to address
two dimensions:
(1) legitimate fact-finding concerning classified
surveillance activity in order to ensure protection of individuals’ rights, and
(2) the ability to appeal to an independent judicial body that can remedy any
potential violation.299
290. See supra Part II.B.4.
291. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, at 42.
292. See id. ¶ 124.
293. See id. ¶ 126.
294. See id. ¶ 125.
295. Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 194 (July 16, 2020).
296. See Case C-362/14, Schrems I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 90 (Oct. 6, 2015)
(emphasizing the lack of opportunity for EU data subjects to access judicial or administrative
redress in relation to U.S. surveillance programs).
297. See Kenneth Propp & Peter Swire, After Schrems II: A Proposal to Meet the
Individual
Redress
Challenge,
LAWFARE
(Oct.
9,
2020,
7:28
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/after-schrems-ii-proposal-meet-individual-redress-challenge
[https://perma.cc/RP4L-RBPG] (explaining the ombudsperson’s role “to receive requests
from Europeans regarding possible U.S. national security access to their personal data, and to
facilitate action by the U.S. intelligence community to remedy any violation of U.S. law”).
298. See Schrems II, C-311/18, ¶¶ 195–96.
299. See Propp & Swire, supra note 297.
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Factual inquiries may be appropriate for administrative groups so long as
they are sufficiently independent. Professors Kenneth Propp and Peter Swire
note that enabling privacy and civil liberties officers (PCLOs) that already
exist within the intelligence community to conduct the fact-finding inquiry
may be viable.300 PCLOs already have the statutory charge to investigate
possible violations of privacy and civil liberties and also already have access
to relevant Top Secret and classified databases.301 Alternatively, the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), a small independent federal
agency, could be empowered to conduct the necessary fact-finding duties.302
Professors Propp and Swire argue that there are a number of advantages of
PCLOs which may speak to their competency to take on expanded
fact-finding duties.303 PCLOs are competent to assess how agencies handle
data because they are responsible for performing “Privacy Impact
Assessments” of any new surveillance systems that an intelligence agency
wishes to implement and are also responsible for issuing regular reports
concerning the intelligence agency’s activities.304 Structurally, PCLOs
report directly to senior officials, which may be helpful should they
encounter problems in the course of conducting an investigation.305 Lastly,
PCLOs have existing staff and resources that are likely able to accommodate
any new investigative responsibilities, such as responding to complaints from
the EU.306
While PCLOs may be most practically equipped to assume factual inquiry
duties because they are part of the intelligence agencies themselves, another
commentator notes that they may not satisfy the independence requirement
outlined by the CJEU.307 Meanwhile, the PCLOB studied Section 702 of
FISA and EO 12333 in the past six years and the EU recognizes and respects
the PCLOB’s independent voice on these subjects.308 And like the PCLOs,
the PCLOB has access to classified and Top Secret resources necessary for
it to conduct adequate factual investigations.309
However, enabling the PCLOB with this expanded responsibility poses
logistical challenges based on its current structure and resources. Because
its statutory mandate currently only relates to oversight and policy at the
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See id. Privacy Impact Assessments are reports done prior to implementation that
determine how a particular program (or product or service if done by a company) impacts user
or subject privacy. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See Christopher Docksey, Schrems II and Individual Redress–Where There’s a Will,
There’s a Way, LAWFARE (Oct. 12, 2020, 10:40 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/schremsii-and-individual-redress-where-theres-will-theres-way
[https://perma.cc/M9H4-B744]
(noting that PCLOs are structured more like data protection officers or chief privacy officers
that are found within companies, rather than independent supervisory authorities like DPAs
and, therefore, could not alone satisfy independent oversight or judicial redress).
308. See Propp & Swire, supra note 297.
309. See id.
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program level, expansion into investigatory tasks would require a statutory
update, which in turn requires congressional action. Conversely, any
expansion of PCLO investigatory duties could be done based on
administrative direction.310 In addition, the existing scope of the PCLOB’s
mandate is limited to antiterrorism; therefore, Congress would also have to
agree to expand that scope to include counterintelligence and national
security more broadly for the PCLOB to be able to conduct effective
fact-finding.311 Lastly, to properly empower the PCLOB, Congress would
have to not only expand its statutory mandate but also support the body with
proper resources and staffing, including maintaining a staffed board.312
Whichever administrative body assumes the role of fact-finder, Professors
Propp and Swire observe, the results shared with the complainant will likely
be similar to those that the ombudsperson would also share—that there was
no violation of the law or that any violation has been corrected.313 The
agency decision could then be appealed to an Article III judge for
independent judicial review.314 The FISC would be capable of the task
because it is comprised of Article III judges who have experience handling
foreign intelligence and U.S. surveillance matters.315
Structuring the complainant’s request like a Freedom of Information
Act316 (FOIA) request could solve the potential standing issues317 the CJEU
highlighted in Schrems II.318 Under FOIA, an individual can request
information or documents from an agency without having to demonstrate any
“injury.”319 The receiving agency is then required to conduct an
investigation and either provide the information or explain why it will not
supply the documents.320 The requesting individual could appeal that agency
decision to a federal court to assess the agency’s investigation and can order
changes to the outcome should there be a mistake.321
In this context, when an individual seeks redress suspecting their data has
been improperly used as part of national security, the FISC could review the
administrative body’s factual investigation to ensure the agency met its
statutory requirements and could issue orders to correct or delete data or
demand additional fact-finding if necessary.322 This sort of review of agency
action or decision-making is common under the Administrative Procedure
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id. (stating “there have been periods since its establishment in 2007 when the
PCLOB lacked a quorum to operate, due to an insufficient number of Senate-confirmed board
members,” which is indicative of how partisan conflict can lead to inaction in Congress).
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See id. (noting that the FISC already oversees Section 702 programs and that the
judges often review agency decisions in their non-FISC capacities).
316. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
317. See Propp & Swire, supra note 297.
318. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 115 (July 16, 2020).
319. See Propp & Swire, supra note 297.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id.
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Act323 (APA). Finally, standing for the individual is established in this
context because the “case or controversy” is the review of the agency action
and whether the agency has complied with the statutory duties on behalf of
the complaining individual.324
III. A HYBRID SOLUTION INVOLVING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW
In an ideal world, the best solution to the current uncertainty surrounding
EU-U.S. cross-border data transfers might center on a new international
agreement—a “Privacy Shield 2.0”—that includes updates to EU data
protection mandates and addresses the CJEU’s objections to U.S.
surveillance law. Absent that highly unlikely scenario, companies and
entities continue to assess the adequacy of the various proposals discussed in
Part II to determine which, if any, can be utilized to satisfy the strict
conditions required by the EU.325
This part argues that the most effective solution for addressing the different
deficiencies articulated in Schrems II is to adopt a hybrid of multiple
private-law solutions discussed in Part II.B, along with manageable
public-law updates discussed in Part II.C. Part III.A addresses why some of
the solutions from Part II are insufficient on their own. Part III.B explains
why the combination of encryption and updated SCCs can mitigate the risk
of the U.S. public authorities improperly obtaining EU subjects’ data. Then,
Part III.C endorses parts of Professors Propp and Swire’s proposal to afford
individuals an avenue to independent redress as the best solution, not only to
fix the redress deficiency but also to meaningfully strengthen oversight of
U.S. surveillance authorities—thereby helping to establish essentially
equivalent protection.
A. The Ineffectiveness of Some Proposed Recommendations
Article 49 derogations emerged in the immediate aftermath of Schrems II
as a possible solution to the problem of inadequacy, perhaps in part due to
the CJEU’s acknowledgment that the article could suffice.326 However, in
the EDPB’s recommendations to exporters about supplemental measures, the
board confirmed that the derogations under Article 49, including consent,
have “an exceptional nature”327 and “must be interpreted restrictively and
mainly relate to processing activities that are occasional and
non-repetitive.”328 Therefore, in light of the EDPB’s subsequent guidance,
which reiterates the “strict conditions” transfers must meet under any of the

323. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring that an agency decision is not “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
324. See Propp & Swire, supra note 297.
325. See Zwillinger et al., supra note 168 (discussing the work done on behalf of clients to
continue business operations without a solid government solution).
326. See Case C-311/18, Schrems II, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 202 (July 16, 2020).
327. EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 25.
328. EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 78.
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Article 49 derogations, it is unlikely to be the mechanism on which most
companies and transfers can rely for adequacy.329
The same EDPB recommendations emphasize technical measures, but
they are unlikely to provide the solution without more.330 Not only are the
outlined parameters for considering encryption to be adequate protection
very strict,331 there is also no redress for the data subjects in the United States
if public authorities do access personal data despite the state-of-the-art
technical measures the exporters and importers employ.332 The importer and
exporter may then be exposed to liability for failing to create adequate
protections. Considering the uncertainty in the space, companies should
conduct thorough assessments of the law and of the practices of public
authorities toward their particular transfers and then combine technical
measures with additional private-law options.333
Many of the suggested contractual promises to inform the exporter and
data subject of public authority access are promising, but in the context of
U.S. importers, however, these recommended provisions may be
impractical—particularly for those electronic communications service
providers that are subject to FISA Section 702, which prohibits disclosure of
any production orders they may receive for the data.334 In that circumstance,
the importer may be able to specify which parts of the exporter’s inquiry they
are legally prohibited from disclosing.335 But ultimately, if the legislation in
the third-party country prevents such disclosure (as FISA Section 702 does
in the United States),336 then the importer will be unable to comply with the
above contractual commitments and will thus fail to provide essentially
equivalent protection.337
The contractual measures that impose an obligation to fight orders from
public authorities to provide data would only be effective according to the
EDPB’s recommendation if the public authority’s access to the data is
suspended while the challenge takes place.338 Additionally, the importer
would have to be permitted to document the actions it takes to demonstrate
to the exporter that it has fulfilled its commitment.339 This is likely
implausible given FISA’s current disclosure restrictions.340
Of course, a provider making promises related to Section 702 of FISA may
still ultimately be compelled to provide U.S. intelligence authorities with the
information because this order is likely legal in the United States.341 In such
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 26.
See supra text accompanying notes 213–20.
See Christakis, supra note 181.
See supra text accompanying note 294.
See generally EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 106(5).
See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 110.
See id. ¶ 119.
See id.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 119.
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a scenario, the U.S.-based importer should inform the exporter of its inability
to further comply with the terms; this notification will permit the exporter to
cease further data transfers and terminate the contract.342 This scenario is
already protected under the existing SCCs and does not require supplemental
terms.343
Importantly, the fact that such an exit strategy is provided for in the
existing SCCs suggests that exporters and importers need not guarantee
absolute security.344 By providing an “out” for when parties cannot comply,
the SCCs—the validity of which was affirmed by the court in Schrems II—
imply a certain tolerance of risk, so long as transfers can be suspended once
compliance is no longer feasible.345 So, while the EDPB’s recommendations
suggest a primarily rights-based approach, there are elements of it that utilize
a risk-based approach where the risk is properly assessed by the data exporter
and importer on a case-by-case basis,346 which could be consistent with
GDPR compliance.347
B. Solving Proportionality with Private Covenants
The most effective and immediate way for companies to continue to
transfer data from the EU to the United States is to adopt measures the
companies themselves can take to mitigate the risk of sacrificing the data
protections required under the GDPR. A combination of state-of-the-art
encryption and enhanced supplemental contractual clauses can provide an
adequate level of protection for EU data subjects that is “essentially
equivalent” to that of the EU.348
As discussed in Part II.B.1, technical enhancements can provide the
required level of legal protection under certain circumstances.349 The final
direction from the EDPB explains that if data is encrypted prior to being
transferred and the U.S. importer does not have the decryption key, then the
encryption is considered an effective supplementary measure.350 In that
scenario, even if public authorities obtain the data in transit or from the
importer directly under Section 702, the data will be useless because the
agency will not be able to match it to an EU data subject.351 So, even if the
public authority technically obtains encrypted or pseudonymized data, the
EDPB will still characterize the EU data as subject to protection so long as
the public authority lacks the capacity to decrypt the data or reidentify the

342. See id. ¶ 114.
343. See SCC Decision, supra note 67, cl. 5(a); see also supra notes 279–81 and
accompanying text.
344. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text.
348. EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶ 77.
349. See supra Part II.B.1.
350. See EUROPEAN DATA PROT. BD., supra note 66, ¶¶ 79–92.
351. See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text.
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subject.352 At a minimum, companies should endeavor to adopt any and all
encryption methods that satisfy these criteria.353
However, technical measures alone will not be enough in some cases.354
For example, whenever the importer requires decrypted data for processing,
that data may be vulnerable under Section 702, or it could be intercepted in
transit via EO 12333.355 Therefore, additional binding protections should be
addressed in contracts prior to transfers.356 Such clauses should first clearly
articulate the encryption tools employed to prevent or minimize actual
access, as discussed above.357 But these clauses should also include
transparency measures and an obligation to take specific actions that are
consistent with what is permissible under U.S. surveillance law.358
These enhanced supplemental contractual clauses should begin with those
that the EDPB has recommended.359 They should clearly identify how the
importers and the data may be subject to the different aspects of U.S.
surveillance law.360 For example, Section 702 of FISA only applies to
electronic communications service providers, so if the importer falls outside
of that definition, the reach of Section 702 need not impact the assessment of
the transfer.361
More critically, the parties can include provisions that obligate the
importers to take legal action (in addition to the technical encryption) to
prevent public authority access whenever possible.362 These could include
guaranteeing good faith efforts to challenge any orders consistent with U.S.
law.363
The problem, however, is that under some of the U.S. laws, such as Section
702, when an importer receives an order from the U.S. public authority
requesting the data, the importer is prohibited from disclosing that fact to
others, including the data subjects or the exporters.364 This may be overcome
with a “canary” provision, whereby the importer sets a regular and frequent
notification confirming that it has not received any request.365 Should that
notification fail to reach the exporter according to schedule, that exporter will
be free to suspend data transfers and notify the data subjects if it believes the
public authorities have accessed that data.366 This “negative notification”
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See supra notes 205–16 and accompanying text.
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does not actually disclose that an order has been received; thus, it should be
permissible and not in conflict with Section 702’s prohibitions.367
These additional obligations recommended by the EDPB, when combined,
can effectively mitigate the risk of overbroad U.S. public authority access to
EU subjects’ data, and they should be adopted immediately.368 Indeed they
are also consistent with the CJEU’s rationale in Schrems II, which articulated
that private parties can take supplemental measures to achieve essentially
equivalent protections for EU data subjects.369 Technical protections, along
with contractual obligations, can clear this legal hurdle and provide practical
protections for EU data subjects. They do not, however, remedy the lack of
judicial redress that was the primary deficiency in Schrems II.370 An
effective remedy would require some level of congressional involvement.371
C. Enabling Individual Redress While Strengthening Oversight
Despite the EDPB’s recommendations and private parties’ best efforts,
private law cannot solve the standing problem for subjects who wish to seek
redress from the U.S. judicial system.372 Therefore, Congress should adopt
the main components of Professors Propp and Swire’s proposal373 for two
reasons: (1) the proposal is a reasonable and logical adjustment that remedies
a consistent deficiency with regard to redress, and (2) the proposal is an
opportunity to actually strengthen effective oversight of surveillance
programs in the United States. Such a result not only benefits the pragmatic
needs of entities that wish to engage in cross-border data transfers between
the EU and United States but also strengthens the state of American
democracy.374
Professors Propp and Swire propose two potential groups that could be
appropriate for the task: fact-finder PCLOs and the PCLOB.375 While
PCLOs may be most readily equipped to assume factual inquiry duties
because of their current role and work at the agencies,376 the PCLOB’s
separation from the intelligence agencies makes it more likely to qualify as
an independent and effective fact-finder consistent with the CJEU’s
assessment of the requirements under the Charter.377 Ultimately, enabling

367. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
368. See supra Part III.B.
369. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.
371. See infra Part III.C.
372. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
373. See supra Part II.C.2. (outlining the proposal to strengthen and expand the powers and
duties of existing oversight agents to permit an avenue of redress for non-U.S. persons).
374. More transparent and effective oversight of the intelligence authorities is an
opportunity to rebuild trust since the Snowden revelations. See supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
375. See supra Part II.C.2.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 304–06.
377. See Docksey, supra note 307 (noting that the PCLOs are structured more like internal
data protection officers or chief privacy officers who are found within companies, rather than
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the PCLOB to assume the fact-finding role is the superior choice because the
board’s entire mission can be focused on oversight, and it does not suffer
from conflicting interests by being a part of the intelligence agency it is meant
to monitor.378 Therefore, to simply, yet effectively, remedy the redress
problem, Congress must take moderate statutory action to update the scope
of the PCLOB’s role, duties, and resources.379
Neither of these bodies would sufficiently address the redress problem on
its own, however, as both are still within the executive branch.380 Professors
Propp and Swire’s proposal effectively addresses this issue by subjecting to
review by an Article III judge the results of any fact-finding done as part of
agency decision-making; this judicial review is similar to that of any
administrative agency decision-making review.381 While the proposed
review would be a new task for the FISC, judges on this court are better suited
for it than traditional Article III judges because of their expertise in U.S.
surveillance law and demonstrated record of effective oversight of Section
702.382
Professors Propp and Swire realize that, due to the classified nature of the
administrative finding, there may not be an effective way for the complainant
to determine whether an appeal to the judiciary is warranted.383 Therefore,
an automatic appeal to the FISC could work to ensure effective judicial
oversight.384 The natural concern, then, would be overburdening the FISC
by permitting a flood of complaints.385 However, that need not be the case
if Congress considers an effective balance when it makes its statutory
updates.386 Also, Professors Propp and Swire highlight that this is not a new
problem; based on prior international agreements with Europe like the
Privacy Shield and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, the “actual
number of complaints would likely be manageable.”387
The other benefit of this proposed remedy to redress is seen during the
appeal to the FISC. The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015388 established a role
independent supervisory authorities like DPAs and therefore could not alone satisfy
independent oversight or judicial redress).
378. See id.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 310–12.
380. See Propp & Swire, supra note 297. The PCLOB, though an independent agency, is
still within the executive branch and ultimately suffers from the same deficiencies as the
ombudsperson under the Privacy Shield. See supra text accompanying notes 298–302.
381. See supra notes 313–15 and accompanying text.
382. See Peter Swire, The Data Protection Commissioner and Facebook Ireland Limited
and Maximillian Schrems, Affidavit of Peter Swire 3–15 (Georgia Tech Scheller Coll. of Bus.
Research Paper, Paper No. 18-2, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3097444
[https://perma.cc/B2NW-NJT4] (stating that, after a review of declassified FISC decisions that
emerged in the wake of the Snowden revelations, the “FISC monitors compliance with its
orders, and has enforced with significant sanctions in cases of noncompliance”).
383. See Propp & Swire, supra note 297.
384. See id.
385. See id.
386. See id.
387. Id.
388. Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
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for amici curiae who can brief the FISC on “legal arguments that advance the
protection of individual privacy and civil liberties.”389 In this capacity, the
amici would also advance the interests of the complainant, allowing the FISC
judge to receive complete adversarial briefings, thus further enhancing the
judicial oversight.390
Finally, the proposed expansion of redress should be made available to
U.S. persons in addition to those making complaints from the EU.391 The
Snowden revelations showed that these surveillance programs also impacted
U.S. persons.392 While reform has taken place since the public learned of the
mass collection programs in 2013, there is value in allowing a limited avenue
of redress for U.S. persons to ensure that oversight keeps the intelligence
community in check.393 This would not upend the standing requirements,
but it would merely empower stronger and more effective independent
oversight of the intelligence community, both at the agencies and in the
judiciary.394 This proposal for redress seems to require the implementation
of more government action, but it might provide the meaningful adjustment
that institutes an opportunity for independent redress that, according to the
CJEU, was critically missing from the Privacy Shield.395
CONCLUSION
In Schrems II, the CJEU confirmed that it will protect the fundamental
privacy and data protection rights of EU subjects when subjects’ data is
transferred out of the EU. That position conflicts with the current scope of
data collection conducted in accordance with U.S. surveillance law. To
resolve this conflict, private entities should do everything they can to
reasonably protect EU personal data that is imported into the United States.
In addition, the U.S. government must also make minor adjustments to
improve and expand the independent oversight of the intelligence
community.
Private actors should adopt supplemental measures recommended by the
EDPB, such as technical encryption and supplemental contract terms that
provide more assurances about the steps they take to protect data from U.S.
intelligence. These measures are consistent with the CJEU’s assertion that
supplemental measures may achieve essentially equivalent protection.
However, if with the assurances, U.S. public authorities still access that data,
the CJEU has been clear that there needs to be some properly independent
avenue of redress for the data subject. Expanding the purview of the FISC
and empowering the PCLOB to perform independent factual investigations

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Propp & Swire, supra note 297.
See id.
See id.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 374.
See Propp & Swire, supra note 297.
See supra notes 140–48 and accompanying text.
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are reasonable and manageable solutions that can enhance data protection
and oversight without opening the entire judiciary to a flood of claims.

